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This	  paper	  argues	  that	  changes	  currently	  underway	  in	  how	  governments	  seek	  to	  manage	  
welfare	  provision	  at	  a	  time	  of	  falling	  budgets	  is	  changing	  the	  options	  that	  are	  available	  to	  TSOs	  in	  
navigating	  these	  welfare	  spaces.	  Drawing	  on	  emerging	  evidence	  of	  changes	  within	  the	  policy	  field	  of	  
supported	  housing	  in	  Northern	  Ireland,	  it	  argues	  that	  a	  model	  in	  which	  government	  has	  sought	  to	  
deal	  with	  the	  third	  sector	  as	  it	  finds	  it,	  based	  on	  an	  acknowledgement	  that	  TSOs,	  while	  valuable	  for	  
public	  policy	  delivery,	  emerge	  from	  organic	  processes	  within	  civil	  society	  itself,	  is	  being	  replaced	  by	  
a	  attempts	  to	  design	  a	  sector	  specifically	  organized	  to	  deliver	  public	  services	  according	  to	  strictly	  
predetermined	  policy	  priorities.	  We	  see	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  view	  within	  government	  that	  conceives	  
of	  partnership	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  resource	  acquisition	  for	  the	  better	  achievement	  of	  government	  
objectives.	  Talk	  of	  partnership	  is	  a	  misnomer.	  	  This	  new	  environment	  is	  closer	  to	  a	  grab	  for	  the	  
resources	  that	  TSOs	  can	  offer	  whether	  these	  are	  legitimacy	  or	  expertise,	  or	  gains	  in	  efficiency.	  The	  
paper	  seeks	  to	  explore	  the	  complex	  relationship	  between	  institutional	  histories	  of	  state	  third	  sector	  
relations,	  the	  narratives	  of	  change	  available	  to	  TSOs	  and	  the	  webs	  of	  belief	  that	  underpin	  their	  
interpretations	  of	  their	  interests.	  How	  come,	  the	  paper	  asks,	  do	  TSOs	  end	  up	  co-­‐constructing	  policy	  
regimes	  that	  systematically	  close	  off	  possible	  futures?	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Introduction	  	  	  	  
The	  literature	  on	  welfare	  reform	  delineates	  a	  trend	  away	  from	  “traditional	  welfarism”	  (Evers,	  
2009)	  in	  which	  social	  rights	  of	  citizens	  are	  underpinned	  by	  state	  financed	  and	  directly	  managed	  
universal	  services	  towards	  a	  set	  of	  much	  more	  fluid	  arrangements	  that	  are	  themselves	  contradictory	  
and	  contested	  (Surender,	  2004;	  Lewis;	  2004;	  Clarke,	  2004;	  Newman,	  2005).	  If	  the	  traditional	  
welfarism	  that	  predominated	  in	  Western	  Europe	  in	  the	  decades	  following	  the	  second	  World	  War	  
was	  typified	  by	  top-­‐down	  hierarchical	  methods	  of	  coordination	  and	  policy	  delivery,	  more	  recent	  
emerging	  forms	  of	  governance	  have	  relied	  on	  a	  more	  complex	  web	  of	  relationships	  in	  what	  Evers	  
(1995)	  has	  described	  as	  the	  “welfare	  mix”.	  This	  process	  of	  change,	  it	  is	  sometimes	  claimed,	  has	  been	  
accompanied	  by	  a	  diffusion	  of	  power	  through	  policy	  networks	  and	  partnerships	  (Rhodes,	  2007),	  one	  
consequence	  of	  which	  has	  been	  an	  enlargement	  of	  the	  political	  and	  social	  space	  occupied	  by	  third	  
sector	  organisations	  (Casey	  et	  al,	  2010)	  as	  they	  have	  been	  increasingly	  incorporated	  within	  
mainstream	  means	  of	  public	  service	  delivery	  through	  a	  process	  of	  outsourcing	  that	  dates	  back	  over	  
two	  decades	  across	  many	  different	  types	  of	  welfare	  regime	  (Bode,	  2006;	  other	  refs).	  	  
Third	  sector	  organisations	  have	  become	  positioned	  in	  the	  welfare	  mix	  in	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  ways,	  
reflecting	  the	  diversity	  of	  the	  sector	  itself	  and	  indeed	  the	  diversity	  of	  policy	  fields	  in	  which	  they	  have	  
become	  entangled.	  	  Attempts	  to	  categorise	  the	  range	  of	  responses	  of	  TSOs	  to	  this	  new	  funding	  
environment	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  relationship	  with	  state	  agencies,	  for	  example	  on	  a	  continuum	  from	  
cooperation	  to	  confrontation	  (Najam,	  2000)	  have	  been	  criticised	  for	  failing	  to	  capture	  some	  of	  the	  
complexity	  of	  the	  relationship	  that	  has	  been	  found	  whereby	  many	  organisations	  that	  participate	  in	  
contractual	  relationships	  combine	  compliance	  and	  resistance	  (Buckingham,	  2012)	  and	  seek	  to	  
exercise	  agency	  to	  strategically	  position	  themselves	  in	  the	  welfare	  fields	  in	  which	  they	  operate	  
(Chew	  and	  Osborne,	  2009),	  some	  to	  preserve	  a	  capacity	  to	  resist	  aspects	  of	  government	  policy	  
while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  becoming	  heavily	  reliant	  on	  government	  contracts	  (Buckingham,	  2012)	  in	  	  
strategies	  that	  seek	  to	  enable	  them	  to	  differentiate	  their	  activities	  in	  ways	  that	  reflect	  their	  
charitable	  or	  nonprofit	  form	  (Cairns	  et	  al,	  2010).	  	  
This	  paper	  argues	  that	  changes	  currently	  underway	  in	  how	  governments	  seek	  to	  manage	  
welfare	  provision	  at	  a	  time	  of	  falling	  budgets	  is	  changing	  the	  options	  that	  are	  available	  to	  TSOs	  in	  
navigating	  these	  welfare	  spaces.	  	  It	  discusses	  this	  trend	  from	  a	  UK	  context	  and	  charts	  a	  change	  from	  
the	  New	  Labour	  period	  to	  a	  post-­‐austerity	  politics.	  Drawing	  on	  emerging	  evidence	  of	  changes	  within	  
the	  policy	  field	  of	  supported	  housing	  in	  Northern	  Ireland,	  it	  argues	  that	  an	  earlier	  model	  of	  
government	  third	  sector	  partnership	  is	  being	  superseded	  by	  something	  quite	  different.	  A	  model	  in	  
which	  government	  has	  sought	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  third	  sector	  as	  it	  finds	  it,	  based	  on	  an	  
acknowledgement	  that	  TSOs,	  while	  valuable	  for	  public	  policy	  delivery,	  emerge	  from	  organic	  
processes	  within	  civil	  society	  itself,	  is	  being	  replaced	  by	  a	  attempts	  to	  design	  a	  sector	  specifically	  
organized	  to	  deliver	  public	  services	  according	  to	  strictly	  predetermined	  policy	  priorities.	  A	  
combination	  of	  continuity	  in	  the	  use	  of	  a	  discourse	  of	  “partnership”	  and	  the	  legacy	  of	  a	  particular	  
institutional	  history	  to	  government	  third	  sector	  relations	  has	  so	  far	  tended	  to	  hide	  some	  of	  the	  
implications	  of	  these	  changes.	  	  
The	  trajectory	  of	  change	  that	  the	  paper	  identifies	  has	  echoes	  of	  processes	  in	  other	  jurisdictions	  
such	  as	  Canada	  (Phillips,	  2012,	  forthcoming)	  and	  in	  the	  UK	  context,	  England	  (Taylor,	  2012a;	  2012b	  
forthcoming).	  The	  paper	  seeks	  to	  explore	  the	  complex	  relationship	  between	  institutional	  histories	  
of	  state	  third	  sector	  relations,	  the	  narratives	  of	  change	  available	  to	  TSOs	  and	  the	  webs	  of	  belief	  that	  
underpin	  their	  interpretations	  of	  their	  interests.	  How	  come,	  the	  paper	  asks,	  do	  TSOs	  end	  up	  co-­‐
constructing	  policy	  regimes	  that	  systematically	  close	  off	  possible	  futures?	  
	  
	  Northern	  Ireland	  is	  of	  particular	  interest	  because	  it	  combines	  being	  a	  fully	  paid	  up	  member	  of	  
the	  post	  austerity	  welfare	  experiment	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  its	  civil	  and	  political	  institutions	  are	  
shaped	  by	  its	  status	  as	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  society	  and	  the	  legacy	  of	  over	  30	  years	  of	  inter-­‐communal	  
violence.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  this	  has	  created	  a	  particular	  instititutional	  history	  that	  is	  leaving	  the	  third	  
sector	  ill	  equipped	  to	  deal	  adequately	  with	  the	  new	  realities.	  	  	  
This	  paper	  draws	  on	  a	  scoping	  study	  of	  the	  ‘Supporting	  People’	  programme	  in	  Northern	  
Ireland,	  a	  complex	  policy	  field	  that	  straddles	  four	  related	  but	  distinct	  policy	  domains	  –	  social	  
housing,	  social	  care	  for	  vulnerable	  adults,	  homelessness	  and	  offender	  management	  –	  and	  where	  
almost	  all	  service	  delivery	  is	  carried	  out	  by	  third	  sector	  organisations.	  	  It	  uses	  analysis	  of	  policy	  
documentation	  and	  interviews	  with	  a	  sample	  of	  housing	  association	  and	  provider	  organization	  chief	  
officers	  and	  government	  officials.	  	  It	  argues	  that	  changing	  ways	  that	  third	  sector	  organisations	  
perceive	  their	  interests	  is	  enabling	  them	  to	  co-­‐construct	  a	  revised	  policy	  regime	  that	  rests	  on	  a	  new	  
language	  of	  “partnership”	  that	  is	  supplanting	  third	  sector	  actors’	  assumptions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  
their	  relationship	  with	  state	  agencies.	  	  Capacity	  to	  resist	  this	  dynamic	  depends,	  it	  is	  argued,	  on	  an	  
institutional	  history	  that	  permits	  the	  emergence	  or	  renewal	  of	  alternative	  voices	  through	  social	  
movements.	  	  
Partnership	  governance,	  policy	  networks	  and	  organisational	  agency:	  towards	  a	  conceptual	  
framework	  
The	  style	  of	  public	  administration	  in	  what	  we	  may	  think	  of	  as	  post	  welfare	  states	  has	  become	  
dominated	  by	  a	  complex	  web	  of	  governance	  networks	  -­‐	  “public	  policy	  making	  and	  
implementation	  through	  a	  web	  of	  relationships	  between	  government,	  business	  and	  civil	  society	  
actors”	  (Klijn	  and	  Skelcher,	  2007:	  587).	  	  Predicated	  on	  an	  assumption	  of	  both	  government	  and	  
market	  failure,	  these	  structures	  are	  widely	  used,	  posing	  new	  problems	  in	  policy	  coordination	  and	  
delivery.	  	  	  
Third	  sector	  organizations	  (TSOs)	  have	  thus	  become	  increasingly	  embedded	  in	  political	  
institutions	  and	  governance	  networks	  within	  the	  policy	  fields	  in	  which	  they	  operate	  (Evers,	  2004;	  
Gronjberg	  and	  Smith,	  2006:	  Dekker,	  2009).	  In	  the	  orthodox	  view	  	  (Bevir,	  2010),	  the	  internal	  
coherence	  of	  these	  networks	  is	  sustained	  through	  sets	  of	  norms	  and	  rules	  that	  determine	  who	  
does	  what	  and	  when,	  and	  the	  ends	  to	  which	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  network	  are	  directed	  (the	  nature	  
of	  the	  social	  problem	  that	  the	  network	  is	  designed	  to	  address).	  These	  institutional	  policy	  fields	  
are	  sustained	  by	  “a	  relatively	  enduring	  collection	  of	  rules	  and	  organized	  practices…that	  prescribe	  
appropriate	  behavior	  for	  specific	  actors	  in	  specific	  situations”	  (March	  and	  Olsen,	  2006,	  p4).	  	  Rules	  
are	  followed,	  it	  is	  argued	  because	  they	  seem	  appropriate,	  natural,	  expected	  and	  legitimate	  
(March	  and	  Olsen,	  1989,	  2006).	  	  
The	  rise	  of	  networked	  governance	  has	  been	  associated	  with	  a	  narrative	  of	  change	  
from	  government	  to	  governance	  in	  a	  process	  that,	  it	  has	  been	  claimed,	  has	  hollowed	  out	  
the	  state	  as	  power	  has	  moved	  down	  and	  sideways	  to	  a	  plethora	  of	  quasi-­‐government	  
institutions	  and	  arrangements	  comprised	  of	  non-­‐government	  as	  well	  as	  government	  actors	  
(Rhodes,	  2007).	  But	  the	  orthodox	  view	  that	  rule-­‐defined	  networks	  are	  self-­‐sustaining	  
entities	  in	  which	  power	  is	  diffused	  has	  come	  under	  attack	  from	  two	  directions	  leading	  
Davies	  to	  declare	  “the	  high	  tide	  of	  networked	  governance	  may	  have	  passed”	  (Davies,	  
2011:	  4).	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   First,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  it	  under-­‐estimates	  the	  residual	  power	  of	  the	  state.	  The	  empirical	  
literature	  shows	  that	  in	  practice	  there	  are	  deep	  inequalities	  among	  the	  parties,	  with	  TSOs	  often	  
being	  at	  a	  disadvantage	  (Alcock	  and	  Scott,	  2002;	  Taylor,	  2003).	  Studies	  have	  consistently	  shown	  
that	  s	  tate	  agencies	  retain	  the	  power	  to	  determine	  the	  rules	  that	  govern	  networks	  in	  policy	  fields,	  
and	  the	  discourses	  that	  sustain	  their	  legitimacy	  (Davies,	  2011).	  	  Using	  a	  Gramscian	  framework,	  
Davies	  (2011:	  101)	  further	  argues	  that	  the	  promotion	  of	  networked	  governance	  “can	  fruitfully	  be	  
understood	  as	  a	  dimension	  of	  neoliberal	  hegemonic	  strategy”	  in	  which	  civil	  society	  is	  captured	  by	  
the	  coercive	  power	  of	  the	  state,	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  powerful	  interests.	  
In	  this	  way	  governments	  continue	  to	  steer	  through	  a	  process	  of	  metagovernance	  
(Newman,	  2005)	  whereby	  they	  define	  the	  context	  in	  which	  network	  actors	  negotiate	  with	  one	  
another,	  who	  should	  be	  included	  and	  the	  terms	  of	  inclusion	  in	  a	  process	  that	  has	  proved	  to	  be	  
“less	  a	  hollowing	  out	  of	  the	  state	  than	  a	  complex	  and	  variegated	  shift	  in	  the	  pattern	  of	  rule”	  
(Bevir,	  2010:	  89).	  	  	  Metagovernance	  occurs	  through	  the	  use	  of	  regulatory	  instruments	  such	  as	  
charity	  law	  (Phillips	  and	  Smith,	  2011)	  and	  the	  imposition	  of	  contract	  based	  funding	  regimes	  that	  
include	  judgments	  about	  capacity	  to	  be	  a	  fit	  provider	  of	  public	  services	  (Carmel	  and	  Harlock,	  
2009),	  but	  also	  in	  sustaining	  the	  normative	  discourses	  that	  allow	  governance	  networks	  to	  
function.	  	  
Second,	  the	  framing	  of	  new	  forms	  of	  governance	  as	  rule-­‐bound	  networks	  not	  only	  tends	  to	  
hide	  underlying	  power	  structures,	  but	  it	  also	  misunderstands	  agency.	  	  The	  treatment	  of	  networks	  
as	  empirical	  objects	  of	  study	  freezes	  their	  components	  in	  time	  and	  cannot	  account	  for	  agency	  as	  
a	  source	  of	  change	  (Bevir	  and	  Rhodes,	  2010).	  Instead,	  in	  decentring	  analysis	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  
social	  construction	  of	  institutions	  “through	  the	  ability	  of	  individuals	  to	  create	  and	  act	  on	  
meanings”	  (Bevir,	  2010:	  85),	  attention	  shifts	  to	  practices	  as	  the	  products	  of	  situated	  agency.	  
Critical	  of	  new	  institutionalists	  for	  not	  taking	  agency	  seriously	  enough,	  Bevir	  and	  Rhodes,	  (2010)	  
elaborate	  the	  concept	  of	  situated	  agency	  as	  the	  capacity	  of	  individuals	  to	  exercise	  agency	  and	  
adopt	  beliefs	  and	  practices,	  but	  always	  in	  the	  context	  of	  existing	  webs	  of	  belief.	  	  Based	  on	  an	  
interpretivist	  epistemology,	  they	  understand	  institutions,	  not	  as	  the	  fixed	  embodiment	  of	  rules	  
and	  norms,	  but	  “sites	  of	  contingent,	  open-­‐ended	  struggles	  over	  meaning”	  (Bevir,	  2010:	  59),	  
conducted	  by	  situated	  agents	  through	  actions	  that,	  when	  they	  coalesce	  into	  an	  identifiable	  
pattern,	  constitute	  a	  practice	  (Bevir	  and	  Rhodes,	  2010:	  75).	  Practices	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  
with	  reference	  to	  the	  webs	  of	  meaning	  and	  belief	  that	  inform	  the	  interpretations	  of	  the	  agents	  
situated	  within	  them,	  including	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  understand	  their	  interests.	  Power,	  in	  this	  
view,	  is	  exercised	  through	  the	  way	  it	  constrains,	  or	  shapes	  the	  interpretation	  of	  interests	  through	  
available	  webs	  of	  belief	  (Bevir	  and	  Rhodes,	  2010:	  76).	  	  	  
	  In	  this	  account,	  governance	  narratives	  are	  contested	  in	  that	  although	  governments	  as	  
holders	  of	  both	  financial	  and	  legitimacy	  resources	  have	  significant	  influence,	  they	  cannot	  
determine	  their	  primacy	  without	  the	  active	  co-­‐construction,	  or	  agency,	  of	  other	  actors.	  So	  
long	  as	  governance	  structures	  in	  which	  they	  participate	  remain	  intact,	  far	  from	  being	  hapless	  
victims	  of	  welfare	  state	  restructuring,	  TSOs	  have	  interpreted	  their	  own	  interests	  to	  act	  in	  
ways	  that	  consolidate	  and	  reproduce	  the	  power	  relations	  that	  are	  embedded	  in	  these	  
structures.	  This	  shared	  understanding	  holds	  these	  structures	  together.	  	  Participating	  TSOs	  
present	  versions	  of	  their	  own	  histories,	  based	  on	  webs	  of	  belief	  about	  their	  interests	  tailored	  
to	  the	  beliefs	  of	  their	  government	  funders	  (Teasdale,	  2010).	  	  	  	  
The	  webs	  of	  belief	  that	  underpin	  these	  interpretations	  of	  interests	  are	  themselves	  formed	  
from	  the	  backdrop	  of	  institutional	  histories,	  correlates	  of	  shifting	  narratives	  that	  embody	  sets	  of	  
ideological	  commitments	  around	  the	  respective	  roles	  and	  functions	  of	  the	  state	  and	  of	  voluntary	  
action	  in	  addressing	  human	  needs	  and	  the	  proper	  relation	  between	  the	  two.	  	  In	  particular	  TSOs	  
draw	  on	  sets	  of	  beliefs	  about	  what	  sets	  them	  apart	  from	  other	  providers	  in	  a	  mixed	  economy	  
welfare	  field.	  	  Comparative	  literature	  shows	  how	  these	  institutional	  histories	  have	  varied	  
between	  differing	  states	  (Salamon	  and	  Anheier,	  1998,	  Kendall,	  2009a,	  Gidron	  and	  Bar,	  2009,	  
Casey	  et	  al,	  2010).	  Single	  country	  studies	  have	  emphasised	  the	  range	  of	  competing	  ideological	  
components	  that	  can	  co-­‐exist	  in	  shared	  state	  third	  sector	  policy	  spaces	  and	  their	  institutional	  
correlates	  and	  how	  these	  have	  changed	  over	  time	  (Kendall,	  2009b;	  Alcock,	  2010).	  	  Such	  
conflicting	  and	  contested	  narrative	  threads	  have	  opened	  spaces	  for	  TSOs	  to	  adopt	  ambiguous	  
strategic	  positions	  in	  these	  welfare	  fields.	  	  
Thus	  understood,	  analysis	  of	  the	  way	  TSOs	  have	  exercised	  agency	  in	  these	  governance	  
spaces	  is	  crucial	  to	  understanding	  how	  they	  work	  and	  the	  ways	  they	  are	  being	  restructured	  as	  
they	  respond	  to	  pressures	  of	  reducing	  budgets	  and	  the	  ideological	  preferences	  of	  governments.	  	  
In	  turn,	  this	  analysis	  requires	  a	  sensitive	  awareness	  of	  the	  ideological	  commitments	  embedded	  in	  
the	  institutional	  histories	  that	  form	  the	  backdrop	  of	  TSO’s	  interpretations	  of	  their	  interests.	  	  
This	  paper	  argues	  that	  the	  case	  of	  Northern	  Ireland,	  a	  region	  still	  in	  the	  process	  of	  transition	  
from	  open	  ethno-­‐religious	  conflict,	  throws	  an	  interesting	  and	  novel	  light	  on	  the	  ways	  that	  a	  
particular	  institutional	  history	  of	  state	  third	  sector	  relations,	  with	  roots	  in	  conflict	  management	  
and	  resolution,	  has	  structured	  TSO	  interpretations	  of	  their	  interests.	  These	  interpretations	  have	  
had	  the	  effect	  of	  closing	  off	  alternative	  voices	  leaving	  the	  sector	  as	  a	  whole	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  a	  
rapid	  reconstruction	  of	  their	  relations	  with	  the	  state	  in	  the	  name	  of	  making	  reducing	  public	  
budgets	  go	  further.	  The	  lesson	  of	  the	  case	  is	  to	  emphasise	  the	  importance	  of	  institutional	  
histories	  of	  TSO	  state	  relations	  as	  a	  reference	  point	  for	  the	  webs	  of	  belief	  that	  underpin	  the	  role	  
of	  TSOs	  in	  the	  co-­‐construction	  of	  post	  austerity	  governance	  spaces.	  
The	  argument	  proceeds	  as	  follows.	  It	  first	  discusses	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Northern	  Ireland’s	  
history	  and	  status	  as	  a	  transitional	  society	  has	  created	  a	  particular	  understanding	  of	  TSO	  state	  
‘partnership’	  and	  a	  set	  of	  institutional	  correlates	  arguing	  that	  it	  has	  left	  TSOs	  with	  little	  room	  to	  
articulate	  alternative	  voices.	  It	  then	  seeks	  to	  examine	  some	  of	  the	  consequences	  through	  
analysis	  of	  contemporary	  pressures	  on	  a	  paradigmatic	  public	  policy	  based	  on	  a	  successful,	  within	  
its	  own	  terms,	  public	  TSO	  partnership,	  ‘Supporting	  People’,	  a	  policy	  designed	  to	  keep	  vulnerable	  
people	  in	  their	  own	  homes	  and	  out	  of	  institutions.	  After	  outlining	  the	  background	  and	  
development	  of	  the	  policy,	  it	  draws	  on	  a	  set	  of	  interviews	  with	  participating	  TSOs	  and	  
government	  officials	  to	  identify	  some	  core	  themes	  that	  throw	  some	  light	  on	  how	  the	  institutional	  
history	  of	  TSO	  state	  relations	  has	  coloured	  the	  ways	  participating	  TSOs	  have	  interpreted	  their	  
Interests,	  leaving	  them	  particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  institutional	  reform.	  	  	  	  The	  interviews	  were	  
conducted	  at	  intervals	  over	  a	  period	  between	  early	  2011	  to	  summer	  2012	  as	  part	  of	  a	  scoping	  
study	  on	  housing	  partnerships	  in	  Northern	  Ireland.	  	  
The	  legacy	  of	  the	  conflict	  
The	  conflict	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  over	  national	  identity	  lasted	  over	  30	  years	  and	  has	  had	  a	  
devastating	  long-­‐term	  effect	  on	  society	  and	  the	  economy	  (Horgan,	  2006).	  This	  has	  impacted	  on	  
the	  policy	  challenges	  faced	  by	  government	  in	  dealing	  with	  that	  legacy.	  It	  also	  provided	  a	  framing	  
narrative,	  initially	  promulgated	  by	  elements	  in	  civil	  society,	  around	  which	  government	  and	  third	  
sector	  relations	  developed	  in	  the	  1990s	  (Acheson	  et	  al,	  2004).	  Webs	  of	  belief	  within	  this	  
narrative	  structure	  about	  a	  broader	  role	  for	  the	  sector	  in	  the	  transition	  to	  peace	  have	  promoted	  
interpretations	  of	  the	  value	  of	  state	  TSO	  partnership	  whilst	  at	  the	  same	  time	  structural	  features	  
of	  the	  1998	  political	  settlement	  closed	  off	  spaces	  for	  alternative	  voices.	  	  
In	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  peace	  process	  in	  the	  1990s	  voluntary	  and	  community-­‐based	  
organizations	  sold	  themselves,	  and	  came	  to	  be	  seen,	  as	  important	  building	  blocks	  in	  
establishing	  and	  then	  sustaining	  the	  community-­‐based	  elements	  that	  underpinned	  the	  
paramilitary	  ceasefires	  (Acheson	  et	  al,	  2004;	  Acheson	  and	  Milofsky,	  2008).	  By	  1993,	  the	  then	  
direct	  rule	  administration	  run	  by	  a	  Conservative	  government	  at	  Westminster	  acknowledged	  
that	  the	  state	  had	  a	  responsibility	  to	  support	  and	  nurture	  community	  development	  in	  a	  policy	  
shift	  that	  also	  had	  a	  clear	  focus	  on	  community	  relations	  (Morrow,	  2012).	  	  	  As	  a	  result,	  TSOs	  
came	  to	  be	  seen	  and	  to	  see	  themselves	  as	  an	  essential	  element	  in	  the	  core	  task	  of	  government,	  
“the	  alpha	  and	  omega	  of	  public	  life”	  (Morrow,	  2012:	  45)	  –	  the	  transition	  from	  conflict.	  	  The	  
sector’s	  role	  developed	  out	  of	  the	  belief	  that	  in	  the	  context	  of	  deep	  communal	  divisions	  and	  a	  
form	  of	  government	  that	  lacked	  democratic	  legitimacy,	  its	  capacity	  to	  organise	  around	  issues	  
that	  crossed	  the	  communal	  divide	  and	  its	  close	  links	  to	  people	  struggling	  with	  “everyday”	  issues	  
offered	  people	  an	  alternative	  route	  to	  political	  influence	  through	  combining	  a	  perceived	  
capacity	  to	  generate	  bridging	  social	  capital	  with	  interest	  group	  representation.	  
The	  1998	  political	  settlement	  produced	  a	  consociational	  compulsory	  coalition	  between	  
two	  broadly	  nationalist	  party	  blocs	  representing	  each	  of	  the	  Irish	  and	  British	  national	  
identities	  within	  Northern	  Ireland.	  As	  in	  previous	  elections,	  in	  the	  most	  recent	  Assembly	  
election	  in	  2011	  there	  were	  almost	  no	  transfers	  of	  votes	  between	  the	  two	  main	  ethno-­‐
religious	  blocs	  (Nolan,	  2012).	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  two	  main	  political	  party	  blocks	  are	  not	  in	  
competition	  with	  each	  other	  for	  votes	  and	  consequently	  ideologically	  based	  policy	  directions	  
are	  never	  decided	  at	  the	  ballot	  box.	  	  This	  has	  tended	  to	  result	  in	  government	  by	  the	  “lowest	  
common	  denominator”	  (Gray	  and	  Birrell,	  2012)	  with	  political	  differences	  over	  policy,	  when	  
they	  arise,	  never	  being	  resolved	  and	  a	  distinct	  risk-­‐averse	  and	  extremely	  path	  dependent	  style	  
of	  public	  administration.	  “Northern	  Ireland	  is	  a	  policy-­‐light	  zone,	  almost	  a	  policy	  free	  zone...	  
It’s	  because	  the	  inter-­‐communal	  divide	  and	  constitutional	  issues	  take	  up	  so	  much	  precedence	  
and	  all	  the	  policy	  issues	  are	  seen	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  the	  position	  of	  the	  respective	  
communities”	  (Trench,	  2011,	  cited	  in	  Nolan,	  2012:	  121).	  	  The	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  
of	  government	  thus	  systematically	  squeezed	  out	  spaces	  for	  the	  maturing	  of	  interest	  group	  
social	  movements,	  capable	  of	  inserting	  alternative	  voices	  in	  the	  political	  process	  (Acheson	  and	  
Milofsky,	  2008).	  
TSOs	  were	  left	  with	  a	  narrative	  of	  peace	  building	  and	  conflict	  transformation	  that	  was	  to	  
have	  no	  long-­‐term	  policy	  correlates.	  Funds	  for	  peace	  building	  were	  enormous	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
1990s	  and	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  2000s.	  But	  almost	  all	  this	  money	  came	  from	  the	  European	  
Union,	  the	  International	  Fund	  for	  Ireland	  and	  private	  philanthropy,	  bodies	  with	  no	  direct	  
responsibility	  for	  public	  policy	  in	  Northern	  Ireland.	  Between	  1994	  and	  2006,	  for	  example,	  the	  
European	  Union	  had	  alone	  contributed	  over	  €1.6bn	  to	  the	  Peace	  Programme,	  almost	  €1.0bn	  of	  
which	  was	  channelled	  through	  the	  voluntary	  and	  community	  sector	  (SEUPB,	  2008).	  	  In	  contrast,	  
government	  funding	  for	  the	  sector	  became	  increasingly	  focused	  on	  public	  service	  delivery	  
(Acheson,	  2010).	  As	  the	  European	  Union	  programmes	  wound	  down	  after	  2006	  and	  became	  
more	  closely	  focused	  on	  achieving	  reconciliation	  outcomes,	  funding	  for	  public	  service	  delivery	  
continued	  to	  grow.	  	  Fuelled	  by	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  contracts	  to	  deliver	  public	  services,	  recent	  
estimates	  suggest	  that	  earned	  income	  may	  now	  comprise	  58%	  of	  all	  third	  sector	  income	  in	  
Northern	  Ireland	  (NICVA,	  2012).	  	  
The	  direct	  rule	  administration	  that	  governed	  Northern	  Ireland	  between	  2002	  and	  2007	  
had	  continued	  to	  view	  the	  third	  sector	  as	  having	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  transition	  from	  conflict	  
in	  its	  2005	  policy,	  A	  Shared	  Future	  (OfMDfM,	  2005).	  	  This	  extolled	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  sector	  to	  
generate	  bridging	  social	  capital	  and	  offered	  it	  the	  promise	  of	  access	  to	  funding	  streams	  that	  
would	  facilitate	  this	  contribution.	  	  But	  there	  was	  no	  time	  to	  integrate	  this	  policy	  initiative	  
into	  the	  development	  of	  joint	  structures	  before	  the	  devolved	  administration	  was	  re-­‐
established	  in	  2007.	  
One	  of	  the	  first	  acts	  of	  the	  new	  administration	  was	  to	  shelve	  this	  policy	  and	  in	  the	  five	  
years	  since	  then	  it	  has	  been	  unable	  to	  agree	  a	  replacement.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  a	  number	  of	  
critical	  policy	  issues	  that	  are	  blocked	  because	  compromise	  between	  the	  two	  party	  blocks	  in	  
the	  Northern	  Ireland	  Assembly	  has	  proved	  impossible	  to	  reach,	  in	  this	  case	  because	  each	  is	  
committed	  to	  a	  diametrically	  opposed	  interpretation	  of	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  Northern	  Ireland	  
conflict.	  	  But	  a	  consequence	  has	  been	  that	  there	  has	  been	  no	  policy	  space	  for	  the	  sector	  to	  
argue	  for	  an	  updated	  version	  of	  its	  1990s	  position	  on	  its	  role	  in	  conflict	  transition.	  	  Coupled	  
with	  the	  systematic	  closure	  of	  political	  opportunities	  for	  social	  movement	  formation,	  in	  
effect	  the	  third	  sector	  policy	  field	  was	  left	  open	  to	  be	  wholly	  populated	  by	  concerns	  over	  
public	  service	  modernisation	  (Acheson,	  2010).	  	  
An	  important	  consequence	  of	  this	  dynamic	  has	  been	  a	  set	  of	  institutional	  relationships	  
between	  the	  local	  state	  and	  TSOs,	  that	  embodied	  a	  commitment	  to	  partnership,	  but	  which	  
had	  derived	  a	  large	  part	  of	  their	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  sector	  from	  their	  roots	  in	  a	  shared	  
narrative	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  sector	  working	  together	  to	  further	  the	  transition	  from	  conflict.	  	  
In	  this	  understanding	  of	  partnership,	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  a	  broader	  goal	  of	  social	  integration	  
and	  social	  inclusion,	  government	  deals	  with	  the	  sector	  as	  it	  finds	  it	  based	  on	  a	  narrative	  that	  
holds	  that	  the	  organic	  features	  of	  third	  sector	  development	  are	  themselves	  important	  for	  
achieving	  these	  goals.	  	  
Now	  a	  government	  that	  understands	  ‘partnership’	  wholly	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  TSOs	  can	  
offer	  to	  help	  deliver	  government	  programmes,	  can	  effectively	  dictate	  the	  terms	  of	  
engagement,	  ushering	  in	  a	  new	  form	  of	  partnership,	  arrangements	  whereby	  government	  
agencies	  charged	  with	  delivering	  public	  policy	  seek	  to	  mould	  their	  third	  sector	  partners	  into	  
what	  they	  perceive	  as	  the	  most	  efficient	  and	  effective	  delivery	  systems.	  The	  argument	  here	  
is	  that	  TSOs	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  are	  trapped	  by	  their	  institutional	  history	  into	  acting	  on	  
interpretations	  of	  their	  interests	  that	  constantly	  reinforce	  this	  dependency,	  leaving	  them	  
particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  imposition	  of	  this	  new	  form	  of	  partnership	  arrangement.	  They	  
have	  nowhere	  else	  to	  go.	  	  Evidence	  emerging	  from	  a	  study	  currently	  underway	  into	  TSO	  
responses	  to	  pressures	  on	  a	  housing	  support	  programme	  for	  vulnerable	  people	  shows	  how	  
this	  is	  done.	  	  
Supporting	  People	  
Background	  to	  the	  policy	  	  
‘Supporting	  People’	  is	  a	  paradigmatic	  policy	  and	  programme	  of	  the	  new	  Labour	  period	  in	  the	  UK	  
and	  was	  a	  particularly	  important	  driver	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  funding	  and	  role	  of	  TSOs	  in	  welfare	  
production	  during	  this	  period	  as	  well	  as	  the	  sets	  of	  relationships	  within	  specific	  welfare	  policy	  fields.	  
The	  aim	  was	  to	  develop	  housing	  support	  services	  that	  would	  enable	  vulnerable	  people	  to	  access	  
accommodation	  suitable	  to	  their	  needs	  (NIHE,	  2005).	  It	  reformed	  the	  way	  housing	  support	  was	  
provided	  to	  vulnerable	  groups	  in	  society,	  substantially	  increased	  the	  resources	  available	  and	  was	  
rolled	  out	  across	  the	  UK	  in	  2003	  according	  to	  shared	  principles	  and	  standards.	  	  
It	  is	  possible	  to	  identify	  three	  dimensions	  to	  the	  problems	  that	  the	  policy	  was	  designed	  to	  offer	  
a	  solution	  (Carr,	  2005).	  First	  there	  was	  a	  perception	  in	  government	  that	  housing	  support	  for	  people	  
at	  risk	  of	  returning	  to	  closing	  forms	  of	  provision	  such	  a	  long	  stay	  hospitals	  was	  not	  strategic	  and	  
spending	  was	  seen	  as	  out	  of	  control;	  second,	  the	  management	  and	  regulation	  of	  provision	  was	  
deemed	  to	  be	  inadequate,	  driven	  by	  initiatives	  developed	  within	  the	  third	  sector	  as	  a	  response	  to	  
the	  absence	  of	  other	  solutions;	  third,	  it	  was	  failing	  in	  a	  fundamental	  requirement	  to	  manage	  risk	  to	  
the	  general	  public	  from	  unruly	  and	  potentially	  dangerous	  people.	  
The	  programme	  thus	  operates	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  three	  policy	  agendas,	  the	  role	  of	  social	  
housing	  in	  a	  neo-­‐liberal	  welfare	  system,	  community	  care,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  discipline	  those	  whose	  
behaviour	  is	  deemed	  anti-­‐social	  in	  a	  world	  of	  responsibilized	  consumer	  citizens	  (Carr,	  2005;	  Clarke	  
et	  al,	  2008;	  Parr,	  2010).	  
Although	  designed	  to	  address	  the	  needs	  of	  people	  who	  are	  homeless,	  ex-­‐prisoners	  and	  victims	  
of	  domestic	  violence	  among	  other	  vulnerable	  groups,	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  programme	  were	  in	  reforms	  
in	  the	  early	  1990s	  to	  the	  way	  vulnerable	  people	  who	  had	  hitherto	  lived	  in	  hospitals	  and	  other	  large	  
institutions	  were	  looked	  after.	  The	  hospital	  closure	  policy	  had	  a	  long	  history	  in	  the	  UK,	  dating	  back	  
to	  the	  late	  1950s,	  but	  changes	  in	  the	  way	  that	  support	  would	  be	  financed	  provided	  the	  means	  of	  
moving	  people	  out	  of	  hospital	  much	  more	  quickly.	  	  Service	  models	  for	  supporting	  vulnerable	  people	  
in	  the	  community	  had	  been	  pioneered	  in	  third	  sector	  organizations,	  some	  of	  which	  had	  been	  set	  up	  
to	  directly	  address	  the	  lack	  of	  state	  recognition	  of	  the	  problems	  they	  set	  out	  to	  tackle.	  The	  
availability	  of	  providers	  and	  a	  government	  commitment	  to	  out-­‐sourcing,	  meant	  that	  most	  of	  the	  
new	  services	  were	  provided	  by	  third	  sector	  organizations,	  many	  of	  which	  had	  been	  active	  in	  the	  
field	  with	  much	  less	  state	  recognition	  for	  many	  years.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  the	  growth	  in	  numbers	  of	  
people	  in	  social	  housing	  requiring	  support	  meant	  that	  housing	  management	  became	  increasingly	  
drawn	  into	  a	  welfare	  role	  for	  which	  it	  was	  ill	  equipped	  (Carr,	  2005)	  as	  more	  tenants	  required	  
support	  to	  maintain	  their	  tenancies.	  	  Demand	  led	  and	  poorly	  regulated,	  public	  perceptions	  of	  the	  
policy	  were	  influenced	  by	  fears	  that	  the	  people	  living	  in	  these	  new	  schemes	  were	  not	  properly	  
supervised1.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In	  1992	  a	  man	  with	  diagnosed	  schizophrenia	  attacked	  and	  murdered	  a	  bystander	  at	  a	  railway	  station	  
giving	  a	  dramatic	  focus	  to	  these	  concerns	  (Carr,	  2005).	  The	  subsequent	  inquiry	  suggested	  that	  poorly	  
managed	  housing	  was	  a	  contributing	  factor.	  	  
These	  policy	  drivers	  pointed	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  dedicated	  budget	  and	  closer	  regulation.	  
Supporting	  People	  was	  announced	  by	  the	  government	  in	  December	  1998	  and	  introduced	  across	  the	  
UK	  in	  2003.	  It	  transferred	  money	  from	  Housing	  Benefit	  and	  other	  sources	  to	  a	  single	  dedicated	  and	  
much-­‐enhanced	  budget.	  An	  idea	  of	  its	  size	  can	  be	  gained	  by	  a	  notional	  budget	  for	  England	  of	  £6.6bn	  
set	  aside	  in	  the	  October	  2010	  Comprehensive	  Spending	  Review.	  In	  Northern	  Ireland	  its	  budget	  in	  
2009-­‐2010	  had	  grown	  to	  £64m	  and	  was	  the	  single	  biggest	  source	  of	  funding	  available	  to	  third	  sector	  
organisations,	  attracting	  many	  organisations	  new	  to	  housing	  support	  services	  in	  the	  process.	  	  
‘Supporting	  People’	  in	  Northern	  Ireland:	  using	  the	  third	  sector	  as	  it	  is	  found	  
The	  structure	  of	  ‘supporting	  people’	  as	  a	  policy	  field	  as	  it	  has	  developed	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  
since	  its	  introduction	  in	  April	  in	  2003	  demonstrates	  features	  of	  state	  third	  sector	  partnerships	  
where	  the	  state	  seeks	  to	  deliver	  a	  regulated	  government	  programme	  through	  the	  sector,	  using	  
delivery	  models	  pioneered	  in	  the	  sector	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  dealing	  with	  the	  sector	  as	  it	  finds	  it.	  	  
The	  first	  feature	  is	  complexity.	  	  This	  has	  its	  source	  in	  the	  multi-­‐dimensional	  nature	  of	  the	  policy	  
field,	  drawing	  in	  the	  government	  departments	  of	  Justice,	  Health	  and	  Social	  Care,	  and	  Social	  
Development	  together	  with	  their	  respective	  non-­‐departmental	  public	  bodies	  (NDPBs),	  the	  
probation	  board,	  the	  regional	  health	  and	  social	  care	  board,	  five	  health	  and	  social	  care	  trusts	  and	  the	  
Northern	  Ireland	  Housing	  Executive	  (NIHE).	  	  The	  programme	  is	  administered	  by	  NIHE,	  but	  all	  the	  
relevant	  NDPBs	  are	  involved	  in	  strategic	  commissioning	  decisions.	  	  	  
The	  complexity	  is	  compounded	  by	  the	  delivery	  system.	  Costing	  £64m	  a	  year,	  the	  programme	  is	  
delivered	  through	  about	  800	  contracts	  with	  about	  110	  third	  sector	  providers	  providing	  services	  to	  
around	  23,000	  people.	  In	  most	  cases	  a	  particular	  scheme	  is	  managed	  and	  delivered	  by	  a	  specialist	  
TSO	  with	  a	  joint	  management	  agreement	  with	  one	  of	  the	  33	  registered	  housing	  associations	  in	  
Northern	  Ireland	  responsible	  for	  building	  and	  managing	  the	  property	  in	  which	  the	  scheme	  is	  based.	  
The	  exceptions	  are	  where	  the	  support	  is	  delivered	  to	  people	  who	  live	  in	  dispersed	  privately	  rented	  
accommodation	  or	  in	  some	  cases	  where	  the	  housing	  association	  provides	  both	  the	  accommodation	  
and	  the	  support	  services.	  	  
Second,	  complexity	  is	  managed	  through	  intelligent	  commissioning	  and	  negotiation	  based	  on	  
long-­‐standing	  relationships	  with	  a	  set	  of	  TSOs	  with	  approved	  supplier	  status	  gained	  from	  passing	  
regulatory	  quality	  benchmarks.	  	  Very	  little	  use	  has	  been	  made	  of	  competitive	  procurement	  
procedures	  with	  the	  managing	  government	  agent,	  the	  Northern	  Ireland	  Housing	  Executive	  (NIHE)	  
very	  resistant	  to	  their	  use.	  There	  has	  only	  been	  very	  mild	  pressure	  on	  participating	  TSOs	  to	  merge;	  
regulation,	  while	  focusing	  on	  adequate	  governance	  arrangements,	  centres	  on	  operational	  quality.	  	  
Once	  service	  standards	  are	  met,	  the	  absence	  of	  competitive	  tendering	  means	  that	  contracts	  are	  
generally	  not	  in	  themselves	  used	  as	  a	  regulatory	  instrument.	  	  	  	  
A	  third	  feature	  flows	  from	  this.	  There	  is	  a	  level	  of	  disconnection	  between	  assessments	  of	  the	  
need	  for	  the	  service	  and	  the	  commissioning	  of	  specific	  schemes.	  Needs	  assessment	  and	  decisions	  to	  
commission	  the	  development	  of	  services	  to	  meet	  needs	  are	  made	  by	  government	  agencies	  at	  arms	  
length	  to	  the	  third	  sector	  providers,	  which	  have	  no	  formal	  role	  in	  this	  process.	  But	  decisions	  on	  
what	  schemes	  to	  put	  on	  the	  ground	  are	  led	  by	  NIHE	  officials	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  existing	  relationships	  
with,	  and	  prior	  knowledge	  of,	  the	  third	  sector	  provider	  partners	  through	  a	  process	  of	  negotiation.	  	  	  
While	  they	  are	  frozen	  out	  of	  decisions	  over	  needs	  assessment,	  this	  approach	  can	  nevertheless	  be	  
seen	  to	  be	  protective	  of	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  approved	  third	  sector	  providers	  as	  there	  are	  no	  
opportunities	  for	  potential	  external	  competitors	  to	  enter	  the	  field.	  	  
Our	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  the	  provider	  TSOs	  are	  nevertheless	  acutely	  aware	  of	  their	  
vulnerability	  both	  to	  competitive	  pressures	  and	  changing	  policy	  priorities	  that	  could	  see	  resources	  
shifting	  elsewhere.	  One	  respondent	  recalled	  a	  particular	  difficult	  negotiation	  with	  its	  housing	  
association	  partner:	  
We’ve recently, for example, renegotiated our service level agreement with the 
housing association and the very first meeting was really quite an angry affair and 
quite difficult, because we were coming at things from very different positions and 
we really did feel that the housing association, which by the way also had a care 
provision wing, was potentially trying to nudge us out.  So that its own care provider 
within its own organisation could take over our schemes, given that they owned the 
housing.  All they needed to do was nudge us out and take over the care.  And at 
the very first meeting I made no bones about saying that, and saying “Look, why 
should I trust you in this discussion?”, because that’s where this could lead to, and 
“If you wipe out our seven housing schemes that decimates this charity.” 
Emerging	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  how	  providers	  seek	  to	  underpin	  their	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  policy	  
field	  depends	  on	  their	  own	  histories,	  but	  that	  two	  narrative	  strategies	  tend	  to	  dominate.	  One	  
homelessness	  charity	  we	  interviewed	  referred	  to	  its	  own	  pioneering	  role	  in	  developing	  services	  
before	  there	  was	  much	  state	  interest	  in	  the	  issue	  and	  before	  there	  was	  any	  formal	  policy	  
framework.	  	  Policies	  and	  services	  and	  standards	  developed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  lobbying	  and	  a	  set	  of	  
pragmatic	  steps	  to	  create	  projects	  where	  they	  were	  needed	  and	  drawing	  in	  housing	  association	  
partners	  that	  seemed	  appropriate	  at	  the	  time.	  The	  agency	  has	  been	  able	  to	  capitalise	  on	  this	  
instititutional	  history	  to	  locate	  itself	  as	  a	  core	  provider,	  to	  an	  extent	  able	  to	  determine	  the	  terms	  on	  
which	  it	  enters	  individual	  schemes	  secure	  in	  the	  knowledge	  that	  the	  Northern	  Ireland	  government’s	  
homelessness	  strategy	  could	  not	  be	  delivered	  without	  its	  service	  portfolio.	  	  
A	  second	  common	  approach	  was	  to	  accentuate	  their	  expertise	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  services	  
they	  provide,	  particularly	  in	  contrast	  with	  state	  managed	  services.	  	  This	  was	  a	  particular	  theme	  for	  
those	  TSOs	  specializing	  in	  mental	  health	  and	  learning	  disabilities	  services.	  	  
For our seven facilities plus our seven resource centres which we’ve also got on 
external assessment we (were) considered to provide the top service.  Now the statutory 
sector I’m sure couldn’t achieve that. 
It becomes especialy important in preserving competitive advantage: 
I think something which I emphasise to all staff here is the importance of reputation.  
So as our reputation grows and strengthens, and we have a very good reputation in this 
specialist field …, what I’ve got to do is ensure that I’m indispensable.  I’ve got to make it 
very clear that the expertise they’re getting in their premises from (our) staff is something 
they couldn’t match, and they would be hard pushed to find any other care provider 
matching. 
Another	  respondent	  commented	  that	  the	  state	  agencies	  were	  allegedly	  using	  Supporting	  
People	  funds	  to	  build	  new	  accommodation	  units	  within	  the	  grounds	  of	  long-­‐stay	  hospitals	  
earmarked	  for	  closure	  in	  contrast	  to	  his	  organization’s	  reputation	  for	  managing	  community-­‐based	  
services	  for	  people	  with	  similarly	  high	  dependency	  needs.	  	  
The	  interview	  data	  suggests	  that	  these	  successful	  TSOs	  interpreted	  their	  own	  interests	  to	  
develop	  strategies	  that	  would	  serve	  to	  embed	  them	  more	  firmly	  in	  the	  policy	  field	  and	  what	  they	  
perceived	  as	  acceptable	  terms.	  Shrewd	  business	  development	  designed	  to	  capitalise	  on	  a	  
pioneering	  presence	  in	  the	  policy	  field	  together	  with	  or	  separately	  from	  a	  deliberate	  policy	  to	  gain	  
and	  sustain	  a	  reputation	  for	  quality	  service	  delivery	  to	  “difficult”	  people	  are	  both	  significant	  
strategies.	  	  Each	  in	  its	  own	  way	  seeks	  to	  exercise	  their	  entitlement	  to	  a	  presence	  in	  the	  policy	  field	  
and	  place	  limits	  on	  government	  funders’	  attempts	  to	  shape	  the	  sector	  to	  their	  need	  to	  proactively	  
design	  the	  most	  effective	  and	  efficient	  means	  of	  delivering	  policy.	  	  In	  interpreting	  their	  interests,	  
they	  draw	  a	  webs	  of	  beliefs	  about	  the	  value	  of	  TSOs	  in	  public	  service	  delivery	  that	  emphasize	  
capacity	  to	  innovate	  and	  expertise	  underpinned	  by	  a	  commitment	  to	  a	  partnership	  model	  that	  
protects	  their	  continuing	  capacity	  to	  demonstrate	  these	  core	  values	  in	  practice.	  
Positioning	  strategies	  such	  as	  these	  have	  permitted	  TSOs	  to	  continue	  to	  operate	  within	  the	  
policy	  field	  with	  reasonable	  success,	  navigating	  a	  regulatory	  regime	  that	  proscribes	  tight	  quality	  
criteria	  on	  organizational	  governance	  and	  service	  outcomes,	  while	  nevertheless	  preserving	  at	  the	  
very	  least	  the	  appearance	  of	  independence.	  
Pressures	  for	  change:	  partnership	  as	  managed	  market?	  
A	  feature	  of	  ‘Supporting	  People’	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  has	  been	  the	  way	  that	  the	  NIHE	  has	  sought	  
to	  manage	  the	  delivery	  of	  the	  programme	  through	  a	  very	  “hands-­‐on”	  approach	  to	  the	  TSO	  partner	  
organizations	  delivering	  the	  services.	  A	  series	  of	  interviews	  with	  NIHE	  managers	  between	  early	  2011	  
and	  the	  summer	  of	  2012	  revealed	  a	  range	  of	  interventions	  mostly	  designed	  to	  shore	  up	  
organizations	  that	  found	  themselves	  in	  difficulty,	  that	  relied	  on	  long-­‐term	  relationships	  and	  only	  
rarely	  directly	  used	  the	  regulatory	  regime	  to	  force	  change.	  	  But	  where	  there	  were	  difficulties,	  these	  
coalesced	  around	  a	  tension	  between	  the	  priorities	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  government	  agencies	  
commissioning	  services	  to	  deliver	  on	  government	  priorities	  and	  the	  varying	  capacities	  of	  the	  
provider	  TSOs.	  Thus	  far	  these	  tensions	  have	  remained	  manageable.	  TSOs	  have	  sought	  to	  navigate	  
such	  tensions	  by	  seeking	  to	  position	  themselves	  as	  individually	  essential	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  
scheme	  so	  far	  as	  it	  affected	  their	  particular	  beneficiaries.	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  policy	  field,	  with	  its	  
management	  operationally	  distinct	  from	  the	  policy-­‐making	  government	  departments	  and	  in	  which	  
managing	  the	  link	  between	  commissioning	  and	  service	  delivery	  has	  been	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  
NIHE,	  has	  left	  participating	  TSOs	  the	  space	  to	  rely	  on	  such	  a	  strategy	  and	  given	  the	  NIHE	  the	  scope	  
to	  intervene	  as	  needed.	  
A	  budget	  freeze	  since	  2008	  has	  put	  many	  providers	  under	  great	  pressure.	  In	  2008	  a	  survey	  of	  
providers	  warned	  that	  by	  2010-­‐2011,	  73%	  of	  schemes	  would	  be	  in	  deficit	  and	  that	  50	  were	  at	  risk	  of	  
closing	  (NI	  Assembly,	  2008).	  In	  the	  event	  by	  the	  summer	  of	  2011	  only	  one	  provider	  had	  been	  wound	  
up	  and	  no	  schemes	  had	  closed,	  although	  there	  have	  been	  a	  number	  of	  mergers	  with	  the	  NIHE	  
encouraging	  providers	  to	  share	  back-­‐office	  functions	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  costs.	  In	  practice	  the	  NIHE	  
has	  been	  able	  to	  allocate	  funds	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  has	  been	  able	  to	  bailout	  providers	  having	  
difficulty	  in	  meeting	  immediate	  wage	  bills.	  In	  some	  cases	  elective	  mergers	  have	  amounted	  to	  
acquisition	  “by	  the	  back	  door”	  in	  that	  the	  funders	  have	  held	  the	  threat	  of	  withdrawal	  of	  funding	  
unless	  it	  went	  ahead	  (Interview	  29/07/11).	  	  Since	  2008,	  the	  number	  of	  providers	  has	  dropped	  from	  
123	  to	  110.	  	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  some	  schemes	  are	  surviving	  only	  through	  freezing	  staff	  wages.	  
This	  was	  in	  the	  context	  of	  broader	  trends	  in	  government	  support	  for	  the	  third	  sector.	  The	  most	  
recent	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  up	  until	  2009/2010	  total	  funding	  for	  the	  third	  sector	  from	  
government	  was	  increasing.	  Funding	  trends	  are	  difficult	  to	  estimate	  and	  are	  unreliable	  due	  to	  
differing	  methodologies	  being	  used	  in	  computation	  and	  to	  incomplete	  data.	  The	  most	  recent	  
estimates	  from	  the	  data	  available,	  taking	  into	  account	  changing	  methodologies,	  suggest	  that	  in	  
2009/10,	  total	  government	  funding	  from	  all	  sources	  was	  approximately	  £392m,	  over	  50%	  of	  total	  
income,	  up	  from	  £279m	  in	  2006/07,	  then	  45%	  of	  all	  income	  (NICVA,	  2012;	  Acheson,	  2010).	  	  
	  In	  the	  current	  spending	  review	  period,	  however,	  the	  overall	  government	  budget	  is	  being	  
reduced	  by	  8%	  (Northern	  Ireland	  Executive,	  2011),	  with	  some	  Departmental	  budgets	  falling	  further	  
than	  that.	  	  The	  most	  immediate	  impact	  has	  been	  significant	  cuts	  in	  funds	  for	  third	  sector	  
infrastructure	  bodies,	  some	  of	  whose	  allocations	  have	  been	  cut	  by	  up	  to	  50%	  (DSD,	  2012).	  The	  cuts	  
are	  themselves	  the	  result	  of	  both	  reducing	  overall	  budgets	  and	  the	  reallocation	  of	  resources	  within	  
government	  departments	  towards	  a	  perceived	  need	  to	  direct	  resources	  directly	  at	  perferred	  policy	  
priorities.	  	  
The	  focusing	  of	  government	  resources	  on	  clearer	  and	  predetermined	  policy	  priorities	  is	  
changing	  the	  nature	  of	  government’s	  partnership	  with	  the	  third	  sector.	  	  Two	  inter-­‐related	  aspects	  of	  
this	  change	  can	  be	  identified.	  First	  as	  in	  ‘Supporting	  People’	  it	  will	  tend	  to	  increase	  pressures	  on	  the	  
TSO	  providers,	  heavily	  reliant	  on	  government	  contracts,	  to	  further	  position	  themselves	  as	  core	  
players	  in	  priority	  policy	  fields.	  	  While	  the	  results	  of	  this	  trend	  are	  to	  an	  extent	  speculative	  at	  this	  
stage,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  it	  will	  be	  reduce	  the	  scope	  for	  ambiguity	  in	  attitude	  among	  participating	  TSOs.	  
Second	  and	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  happens,	  these	  TSOs	  will	  in	  turn	  become	  willing	  participants	  
in	  the	  restructuring	  of	  partnership	  with	  government	  as	  an	  explicit	  tool	  for	  achieving	  policy	  
objectives	  in	  policy	  fields	  whose	  participants	  are	  chosen	  by	  government	  for	  their	  efficacy	  and	  
efficiency.	  	  Policy	  fields	  where	  partnerships	  are	  between	  government	  agencies	  and	  a	  third	  sector	  as	  
government	  finds	  it,	  will	  be	  replaced	  by	  partnerships	  with	  a	  third	  sector	  designed	  to	  meet	  
government	  objectives.	  	  The	  redirection	  of	  resources	  away	  from	  third	  sector	  infrastructure	  has	  both	  
symbolic	  and	  practical	  dimensions,	  signalling	  a	  clear	  change	  in	  government	  from	  a	  view	  of	  that	  
valued	  the	  third	  sector	  as	  an	  independent	  partner	  requiring	  investment	  in	  its	  capacity	  to	  something	  
more	  narrowly	  conceived.	  	  	  
At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  ‘Supporting	  People’	  as	  an	  exemplar	  policy	  field,	  is	  at	  the	  cusp	  of	  radical	  
change	  that	  is	  likely	  to	  sweep	  away	  its	  current	  structures.	  	  At	  present,	  the	  NIHE	  manages	  its	  TSO	  
suppliers	  through	  a	  quality	  control	  system	  that	  polices	  entry	  to	  the	  field	  and	  sustains	  the	  quality	  of	  
services	  that	  are	  provided	  and	  through	  a	  set	  of	  long-­‐term	  relationships	  based	  on	  funding	  
arrangements	  that	  are	  themselves	  ambiguous	  (not	  quite	  legal	  contracts).	  	  This	  is	  all	  now	  under	  
threat.	  The	  government	  Department	  responsible	  for	  housing	  policy,	  the	  Department	  for	  Social	  
Development	  (DSD),	  is	  reviewing	  the	  Supporting	  People	  strategy	  at	  present	  with	  three	  objectives	  in	  
mind.	  First	  it	  describes	  the	  commissioning	  process	  as	  “not	  fit	  for	  purpose”	  (interview,	  08/05/12)	  
with	  insufficiently	  clear	  links	  between	  the	  commissioning	  objectives	  and	  the	  supplier	  hired	  to	  
provide	  the	  service.	  Second,	  and	  related	  to	  this,	  there	  is	  held	  to	  be	  a	  lack	  of	  transparency	  in	  the	  
demonstration	  of	  value	  for	  money	  through	  the	  absence	  of	  public	  procurement	  methods	  in	  choosing	  
suppliers.	  Third,	  and	  more	  fundamentally	  since	  its	  implementation	  would	  dismember	  the	  policy	  
field	  altogether,	  it	  is	  determined	  to	  break	  the	  link	  between	  the	  policy	  areas	  of	  housing	  and	  social	  
care	  by	  handing	  the	  money	  that	  is	  currently	  being	  spent	  on	  supporting	  people	  with	  learning	  
disabilities	  and	  long	  term	  mental	  health	  problems	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Health,	  Social	  Services	  and	  
Public	  Safety	  (DHSSPS)	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  expenditure	  is	  being	  driven	  by	  health	  policy	  priorities	  
rather	  than	  housing	  priorities,	  namely	  the	  objective	  of	  closing	  the	  last	  remaining	  long-­‐stay	  hospitals.	  
Since	  this	  accounts	  for	  about	  65%	  of	  the	  Supporting	  People	  budget,	  the	  consequences	  for	  the	  
programme	  as	  a	  whole	  of	  doing	  this	  are	  self-­‐evident.	  	  
So	  far	  as	  the	  rump	  ‘Supporting	  People’	  programme	  is	  concerned,	  the	  DSD	  has	  already	  
demonstrated	  a	  preferred	  model	  of	  contractual	  relationship	  having	  already	  enforced	  just	  three	  
consortia	  bids	  from	  the	  33	  registered	  housing	  associations	  for	  building	  social	  housing	  (Acheson	  and	  
Muir,	  2011)	  and	  similarly	  required	  the	  sector	  infrastucture	  organizations	  it	  funds	  to	  submit	  prime-­‐
contractor	  supply	  chain	  bids	  from	  pre-­‐determined	  groups	  of	  organizations	  the	  Department	  itself	  
identified.	  	  	  
Some	  speculative	  conclusions	  
At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  the	  radical	  changes	  to	  the	  ‘Supporting	  People’	  programme	  outlined	  here	  
are	  to	  an	  extent	  speculative.	  	  But	  there	  is	  enough	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  the	  direction	  in	  travel.	  
Whatever	  changes	  are	  in	  the	  end	  implemented	  are	  likely	  to	  demonstrate	  an	  abandonment	  of	  a	  
relationship	  between	  government	  and	  the	  third	  sector	  based	  around	  beliefs	  in	  the	  equivalent,	  yet	  
complementary	  roles	  of	  each	  party	  in	  a	  larger	  endeavour	  of	  transforming	  society.	  Rather	  we	  see	  the	  
formation	  of	  a	  view	  within	  government	  that	  conceives	  of	  partnership	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  resource	  
acquisition	  for	  the	  better	  achievement	  of	  government	  objectives.	  Although	  the	  Northern	  Ireland	  
government	  still	  talks	  of	  partnership,	  it	  is	  a	  misnomer.	  	  This	  new	  environment	  is	  closer	  to	  a	  grab	  for	  
the	  resources	  that	  TSOs	  can	  offer	  whether	  these	  are	  legitimacy	  or	  expertise,	  or	  gains	  in	  efficiency.	  	  
The	  larger	  argument	  concerns	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  TSOs	  co-­‐construct	  these	  emerging	  policy	  
spaces.	  	  This	  paper	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  webs	  of	  belief	  that	  inform	  TSOs’	  interpretations	  of	  their	  
interests	  in	  turn	  shape	  their	  strategic	  positioning	  in	  policy	  fields.	  Interview	  data	  reported	  here	  with	  
TSOs	  that	  are	  already	  heavily	  committed	  to	  a	  particular	  policy	  field	  suggests	  the	  kinds	  of	  narrative	  
that	  they	  use	  to	  sustain	  their	  position.	  	  The	  argument	  that	  this	  paper	  addresses	  is	  that	  the	  
institutional	  contexts	  in	  which	  government	  TSO	  partnerships	  have	  developed	  play	  an	  important	  role	  
in	  the	  formation	  of	  available	  beliefs.	  	  The	  Northern	  Ireland	  case	  suggests	  how	  important	  these	  
contexts	  can	  be.	  Here,	  a	  history	  in	  which	  the	  idea	  of	  partnership	  was	  initially	  sold	  to	  the	  government	  
by	  the	  third	  sector	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  shared	  endeavour	  to	  secure	  the	  transition	  of	  Northern	  Irish	  
society	  from	  conflict	  to	  peace,	  coupled	  with	  a	  political	  opportunity	  structure	  hostile	  to	  the	  
formation	  of	  interests	  in	  the	  political	  arena	  outside	  of	  the	  ethno-­‐religious	  divisions	  that	  structure	  
politics,	  together	  starve	  TSOs	  of	  alternative	  narratives	  that	  could	  sustain	  visions	  of	  their	  future	  
outside	  of	  their	  resource	  dependent	  relations	  with	  government.	  This	  has	  left	  many	  to	  interpret	  their	  
interests	  as	  lying	  in	  a	  greater	  commitment	  to	  the	  newly	  emerging	  form	  of	  partnership	  –	  a	  
government	  grab	  for	  the	  resources	  the	  sector	  is	  thought	  to	  offer.	  
Understanding	  the	  dynamics	  of	  change	  in	  government	  third	  sector	  relations	  requires	  both	  close	  
attendance	  to	  the	  meanings	  that	  third	  sector	  actors	  give	  to	  their	  strategic	  positioning	  decisions	  
together	  with	  critical	  policy	  analysis	  and	  a	  sharp	  appreciation	  of	  the	  historical	  narratives	  that	  actors	  
draw	  on	  to	  form	  the	  webs	  of	  belief	  that	  underpin	  their	  decisions.	  	  This	  paper	  has	  attempted	  to	  offer	  
a	  way	  in	  to	  a	  wider	  research	  agenda.	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